

How to rebuild Russia.

Our eastern neighbor constantly imposes Ukraine the discussion of internal development of Ukraine.

We have braced ourselves the courage to think about: which is Russia now and what will be the political and legal space towards the East of Ukraine after Putin.

What are the possible scenarios of the development of the situation in Russia in the intermediate date and how must Ukraine respond to them.

Is Russia a true federation, are the rights of national minorities upheld on its territory, is there a fair distribution of national wealth.

HOW TO REBUILD RUSSIA

EXPERT DISCUSSION

Kyiv, 2015

Leaders of project

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The discussants purported to concretize a new eastern policy of Ukraine, analysis scenarios on the territory of the Russian Federation and Ukraine possible response strategies.

Leaders of project: Society «Erzian Wall» of Kyiv
Non-governmental analytical center
«Ukrainian studios of strategic disquisitions»



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PREFACE TO COLLECTED ARTICLES

Issues involving nations and nationalism in a global age are comprehensively investigated by many scholars. In particular, there are studies published by a famous British social scientist Anthony Smith. However, when it comes to the modern Russian Federation, it stands out from the established scientific discourses. The reason is not due to the «special path» of imaginary Russia, but in actions that have denied and discredited the very idea of existence of nations and nationalism on the territories controlled by Moscow. In order to negate the effects of this Russian trickery, there appeared a scientific intuition about existence of conglomerate of «merged nations», something like a harbor of stateless nations which have their own history, borders, wars, internal conflicts. This is, actually, what appears to be the «knowledge about Russia».

«Knowledge about Russia» was successfully developed in the countries occupied by Moscow in early-modern times: Finland, Poland and Ukraine. The XIX century is the time when scientific and political elites of these countries «were finally cooked» in the Moscow pot. They were ready to see the implicit, even paradoxical mechanisms of Russian colonialism and its representation.

However, Ukraine went furthest in the vision of «invisible countries» as it was declared by Moscow the non-existent country until the conqueror turned into the conquered. Moreover, Ukraine itself took an active part in the projects developed by the Russian Empire. For instance, graduates of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (the early-modern Ukrainian university, created on the model of Jesuit colleges in 1620) threw the countries of North Asia at the feet of Moscow's monarch. Educational and missionary practices of the Jesuits were well «grounded» by Ukrainians in the Russian Empire: from Erzya Tambov to American Aleuts. With that, Ukrainian agents of

«sovereign of all Little, White and Great Russia» captured not only the territories, but also the souls of European and Asian countries. This was captivity not only for Christ, but also for Moscow, which, like a chameleon, changed colors and turned into all types of disgraces known by the humanity at the time.

Despite this, Ukraine in the XIX century was able to create not only its own national narrative (from the Cossack Chronicles to the first rector of Kyiv University Maksymovych, from Maksymovych to Professor of Kyiv University, historian Volodymyr Antonovych, from Antonovych to Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, the founder of Ukrainian history Department at Lviv University), but also the school of thought about «Moscow-the owner of the occupant territories». It was «the Ukrainian repentance».

A key figure here is Dr. Yuriy Lypa and his iconic work «Distribution of Russia», written in the midst of the World War II. After Yuriy Lypa we can speak about Russia in terms of «shock geography» — the true political map of Eurasia: from Smolensk to Kamchatka and from Murmansk to the Kuban. This map contains up to 40 invisible (not obvious) countries.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Western world counted 14 new countries with cautious enthusiasm. Among them Ukraine, as the biggest country of the Old world, was the most dramatic geographic new development for Europe. It seemed like the end of the Empire, which squeezed itself within the «core of the Russian people». However, with the beginning of new colonial wars initiated by Moscow, including the annexation of the Crimea, it is obvious that the possessor of «invisible countries» hunts for new victims. It is so because the «Russian core» does not exist at all. There is Chaikovskyi, Bulhakov, Dostoievskyi and Chekhov. However, there is no core. There is only the Kremlin with its religion — systematic robbery, based on exploitation and the endless defamation of spiritual foundations of the occupied territories.

On June 27, 2015 about a hundred people gathered at Lukyanivka military cemetery. They buried a commander of volunteer battalion «Luhansk-1» Temur Yuldashev. On the pre-

vious day, the Deputy Director of the Institute of National Remembrance Pavlo Podobied contacted his mother who lives in Mordovia. This is one of Finno-Ugric republics of the Russian Federation. She did not come to the funeral of her son who died by the hands of Russian soldiers on Savur-Mohyla. However, she is not bored there as the FSB officers and venal Russian journalists regularly visit her. What for? Because, according to them, a Mordovian «slave» Yuldashev took arms and died for Ukraine!

In the fate of Yuldashev, we can trace a close destruction of Moscow from the arms of Finno-Ugric peoples, who are now considered to be the most loyal to the Kremlin. After 17 Finno-Ugric countries are «released», there shall be no modern Russia (the so called «Heartland» of the Russian people). The very definition of the «Russian people» will be transformed. By restoring identity of 150 million «Russians» they will have their Finno-Ugric homeland, which borders with Slavic, Baltic and Turkish peoples. The Russians still acquire a homeland that will hand over all the history of Moscow princes (including the last chekist) to the Horde Museum.

During this transformation (or, use the Greek locution «metamorphosis») the free people must be ready to open embassies and to participate in the development of this wounded world. This task will be like a new Marshall Plan for Germany affected by Nazi in 1940s. No humiliation, no looking for easy prey, no new bondage by Western capital, but cooperation with big post-Russian Asian and European nations — this is the Ukrainian vision of «distribution of Russia». Articles within this collection for now are just replicas and essays to a fascinating discussion about 40 countries, which will soon appear.

P. S. We understand that existence of «invisible countries» in a global age looks like a sort of an intellectual game or even a sophisticated fraud. Such was the case with «the Ukrainian question» in the early XX century. In 1911, a new edition of Encyclopedia Britannica mentioned Kyiv as «ancient Russian city». Six years later, Kyiv became a capital of Ukrainian Peo-

ple's Republic with embassies of Turkey, Finland, Bulgaria and Germany. The required changes were made in new editions of Encyclopedia. It is obvious that knowledge about Russia still is conditional and temporary by nature. It is not necessarily right to assume that things will be better in a foreseeable future. It will happen, however, if the whole world looks boldly at the map of changes offered by Ukrainians in the circumstances of war with Russia.

Rostyslav Martynyuk

Juriy Syrotyuk

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Subject of our round table «How to rebuild Russia?» — is not a PR stunt and is not a reference to the same title of the book published by Solzhenitsyn. It is an attempt to give serious answers to questions of our and European eastern policy, which, unfortunately, are taboo in Ukraine's media. «Ostrich's» policy of not noticing the problems, absence of scenarios regarding the area that in immediate prospects can cease to be uniform, and ferroconcrete firmness of Russian empire do not authorize us to predict succession of events on post-Russian area. **What will come of Russia after Putin? Will it be liberal empire within present borders, or for Russia it is more natural to construct a true confederation of independent national states? How shall we operate in case of development of events into an uncontrollable chaos — this is the core of our discussion. Its purpose — to outline contours of real and active east policy of Ukraine.**

Whilst Putin's regime embodies its mad ideas of conquest, and more exactly destruction of the world, we should not behave in similar manner toward people who became citizens of this empire by the will of destiny. How to help Russians and other residents of Russian Federation to get liberty and protect their civil rights, what we can offer them after the regime falls, what we can already do today for protection of rights of our fellow-citizens, who have found themselves in Russia — these are practical subjects of our discussion. I do not think that this war carries happiness to a Yakut, who has been secretly driven to destroy Donbas, the same as a Moscovite, who is derogated publicly by this Yakut in suburbs of

Donetsk. Obviously, it is necessary to search for an answer to the question how to destroy Moscow imperialism, because it destroys not only the neighboring countries, but, first of all, souls and bodies of people who reside in this empire, and this state of events it is not favourable for anybody. Practice of conciliation, civilization of Russian Federation through increase of economic potential of the country lead neither to more civilized behaviour of leaders of the Russian state, nor to increase of welfare of population of the empire. Only military solution can become a push for growth of national self-comprehension and civil rights. What will come of Russia after Putin? He is not eternal. How to coexist with this future post-Russian area not only with neighbours, but also citizens of this country? As there is less bread in Russia, and TV shows are based on blood and death, already inside Russia there is a formation of a dangerous character. We, as neighbours, can help people who reside in Russia, and also our brothers, who live there. Having opened «Pandora's box» concerning control of borders, Russia opens a space of discussion about what states and within which borders it will exist on post-Russian area. We have talked about this at a serious academic level at our round table. I hope that it will help to form deliberate, well-reasoned and adequate policy of Ukraine regarding Russia.

In addition, I would like to add: we should not forget, that Russia is a territory, where there is also four thousand nuclear warheads. And it is threat for the whole world.

Volodymyr Kryzhanivskiy

*The first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of Ukraine in Russian Federation*

... We should understand precisely that there is no fraternity, **and the idea that the Kremlin elite and Russian people are separate — is wrong. As these people were brought up in the particular way for centuries, certain mentality (i. e. the idea of imperialism) was developed. And this empire, which was built for centuries, will be self-efficient. Putin will stand aside — but there will be another one, who may be even worse.** I recently heard an idea that they would be near Warsaw under Yeltsyn. What Putin is doing now is called «nourishment». He feeds Russia with extensive developments, natural resources, oil. We have to understand precisely, that this disaster will last a long time, if not forever.

Ukrainians support a sense of difference not to become imperialists themselves, but there are those who do support that idea. Only precise understanding with whom we are dealing here can lead to normal relations.

To say that we are blood brothers is impossible, for we are not like them. Finally, we see the truth. Certainly, there are normal, conscious people there, but they are almost an exception. We have to understand that an awful imperial bear is near, as it is possible to agree even with Poles — because they are European people after all...

Rostyslav Martynyuk

Co-chairman of Kyiv society «Erzian Wall»,
Historian, Finn-Hungarian philologist

SHOCK GEOGRAPHY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Great geographical discoveries» were made by Europeans since the 16th century — then expediting missions of Spanish trading stations have discovered America. At the same time, in the East of Europe, Moscoviya made «great geographical discoveries» too. It made them for trading benefits, but number of discovered and formally taken remains were incomprehensible even for most educated minds of the Russian empire.

Actually, comprehension and development of the things formally conquered by Moscow in Asia (since Christopher Columbus's times) begun starting from the Bolsheviks — in 1920s. Ukrainian political scientist Juriy Lypa illustrates this by using a simple example: one of Moscow's expeditions opened in newly conquered eastern Siberia the whole mountain ridge, which peaked 3 kilometers high! Neither tsar Peter the Great, who owned formally this ridge, nor his descendant emperor Mykola II, who liked to travel across boundless Russia (where were both Ararat and Lappish seids), Pochaiivsk Lavra and Kamchatsk geysers, knew about it.

However, true Bolsheviks' discovery of the 20th century was the political history of the countries, which were once conquered by Moscow Empire. Certainly, it was not regarding Poland, Ukraine, Finland or Estonia, independent movements of which were known in 1917 practically to all. *The Bolsheviks on their home front discovered up to forty new countries — Bashkortostan, Buriatiya, Kareliya, Ingermanland, Kalmykiya and*

*even Mariy Al, Udmurtiya, Komi and Khantiya and even more «exotic»ones. All of them with weapons in their hands declared the right to **own nationality**.*

*After a series of new aggressive conflicts, which the Bolsheviks called «civil wars», a federal nationality (quasi independence) received only 25 of them — in the form of republics and districts. Such simulations occurred not because of bolshevik's love for giving people a right for «self-determination» or political-administrative experiments. Please note, a reward in the form of «national republic» **was received only by one country, which has taken weapons to hands in order to assert its true independence**. So, all 25 wars against future «republics» eventually were won by Moscow. As a classical winner, Russia itself determined their borders.*

For example, Karelia received only a third of its territories in RSFSR — 2/3 of its territory were given to Leningrad, Volohda, Novhorod and Murmansk regions. Subdued Sakha-Yakutia — after Russian-Yakut war of 1918–1920s — was cut off from the Pacific ocean. «Interesting» territorial «contributions» from «fraternal brothers». Exceptions were not made to anybody. The Lapps and the Veps, who, in a way, asked Moscow for national district, have not received anything. The Bolsheviks did not respect the weak and the unarmed.

Present Russian Federation has inherited that Bolsheviks' geography — it still has 21 «national» republics, 4 «national» autonomous districts and one «national» region among 83 subjects of Russian Federation. These «special regions» never gave rest to Moscow — they were an obvious demonstration of military valour of the subjugated people.

Who are «the Russians» in this struggle of nations on territory of former Russian empire? Victims or allies of the Bolsheviks? The Bolsheviks, whilst building a new factory of exploitation of subjugated people in 1920s, kept «Russian people/the Russians» terms within the «imperial cluster». Russian people did not object much. Then, the Bolsheviks' regime alienated territories — from Saha up to Karelia — in

the interests of Russian people. New Putin's Russia did the same.

After 1991, Moscow annexed four autonomous districts in favour of «nation-free» subjects of RF. However, it has not gone further. It has not taken a risk. Kazan, Ufa, Yakutsk, Syktyvkar, Ulan-Ude, Maikop, Yokshar-Ola are not «fake» capitals of fake states. It is only a small peak of **Shock Geography of Russia**, which exists covertly, but is stained by blood of Euro-Asian nations.

Shock Geography of Russian Federation has an invisible hero. It is mentioned «Russian person». Who is he, an owner of magic imperial wand?

Russian people do not have a separate status in Russian Federation, and did not have one in the USSR. It did not prevent them to be owners of this state de facto and to control all people who have «national republics» in modern Russian Federation. What kind of phenomenon is it? At the end of my speech I shall try to explain it, and then I shall offer something for Russian people themselves — separately for those in Asia and those in Europe. Although it looks pretentiously, we must remember: our meeting is devoted not simply to the subject «How to rebuild Russia?», but we also aim to answer a question «What can we offer for Russian people?»

ON GEOGRAPHY OF RUSSIAN ASIA

Eastern Siberia

Russian Federation has 60 thousand kilometers of external borders. Which is three times bigger than Ukraine and includes Saha-Yakutia in eastern Siberia, Buriatia, Tyva and Zelenyi Klyn. There is one more great Russian autonomist with projects of Siberian Republic, which bids for preservation of old, dominant positions of European migrants on all post-Russian area of Asia. It is inclined, however, to hide such directive

behind traditional rhetoric of «brotherly mutual relations» and simple «**we shall agree**».

Destiny of Saha-Yakutia on post-Russian area, after Putin, is correlated by its role in North-East Asia in the 20th century. Conquered by Moscow in 1920, newly formed Yakutsk ASSR could get the biggest territory — with connection to the Arctic ocean. Yakutia has kept informal leadership among paleo-Asian countries of Russia — from the West of its borders, the East, to Chukotka and Kamchatka. After Putin, in a scenario of disintegration of Russian Federation, it will bid for return of the Okhotsk coast in the East, and in the South — conterminous with Buriatia. On the North it will have conterminous with Canada, probably having inherited discussion about destiny of well-known shelf on the North Pole.

Experts in Geopolitics of eastern Siberia speak about an opportunity of integration into Saha of post-Russian territories, including Ukrainian Zelenyi Klyn, which should receive guarantees of its identity in Saha and remain in original commonwealth of Ukrainian states of Eurasia — Zhovtyi Klyn in Volga regions and Siryi Klyn in western Siberia. In Zelenyi Klyn, Ukrainians represent not the «city-type» soviet emigrants, but an agricultural civilization with powerful demographic resources and strong identity.

A well-known German once said: Ukrainians are the British of the East. The analogy of state-colonies of Great Britain — Australia, New Zealand, SAR, and state-colonies of Ukraine — Zhovtyi, Siryi and Zelenyi Klyn was meant by this.

Zelenyi Klyn should find a form of coexistence in post-Russian area with newly formed states, otherwise negotiations on guarantees of sovereignty for Zelena Ukraina should be obtained either in China or in Japan. In structure of Siberia, de facto, the «Great Russian» state called Zelenyi Klyn can hope, perhaps, for destiny of Quebec in Canada.

Buryatia. An attempt to disintegrate in 2000s was not successful. Two national districts were removed. Nevertheless, Baikal remains de facto Buryatia's lake though this is not for-

malized. Irkutsk and Chytnyng regions are property of Buryatia. **Tyva** automatically restores state independence, lost in 1944.

Western Siberia

Formally Hunty-Mansiyskiy district, which represents Finn-Hungarian world, the main part of which is located in Europe. The West Hunty-Mansiyskiy district-Yugra is limited by the Urals, in the East contact zones of the Yugres and paleo-Asian people reach the Yenisei. Critical degree of colonization in HMAD came in 1960s. Therefore, in 1920s, the ratio of immigrants and native people — the Mansies and the Hunties — was one to one. Now, however, it more like 1 native to 50 migrants.

Powerful non-agricultural Ukrainian community of HMAD is integrated into Russian cities-colonies. From the point of view of strategy, Ukrainian part of population of HMAD, by fact, are agents of Gazprom — as the latter is the main employer and customer of colonization of Yugra and contiguous Neniya.

In spite of the fact that Huntyisk and Mansiysk nationalists have achieved the status of «patrimonial objects of area of economic significance» for large territories, on which an extraction of minerals is performed, there is financial resource for creation of Yuhorsk nation on territory of the District, which ideologically and diplomatically will be supported by Hungary.

Geographically southern borders of Yugoriya are enclaves of Komi, Erziyanskiy and Belarus settlements, which constitute also northern periphery of **Siryi Klyn** — one more Ukrainian «Australia» in Russian Siberia. Despite marginality being the theme of Western-Asian Ukraine, potentially the project «Siryi Klyn» has greater geopolitical and practical interest than Far Eastern «Zelenyi Klyn», which, so far, had just struck gold with «popular writers».

Siryi Klyn is 460 thousand square kilometers. The biggest cities are Omsk and, peripherally, Novosibirsk. Informal

capital is Slavhorod. Political history of Siryi Klyn was already written in 1947. The author — Tymofiy Olesiyuk, published a monography titled «Ukrainian colonial state in Asia. Sira Ukraina» in Geneva. Since then, the publication was only made in «Suchasnist» magazine dated 1993.

These days, 2/3 of Siryi Klyn is within Kazakhstan, which became additional factor of disintegration of the Ukrainian colony. In post-Putin's time, variants of integration of all Siryi Klyn into Kazakhstan and an occurrence of Yugorsk-Kazakhstan border seems plausible. If this happens, Ukraine's actions should be similar to those regarding Siryi Klyn — it is necessary to demand guarantees of autonomy of Ukrainian agricultural territories.

Eastern Europe. Countries of Kazan khanate

Six countries of former Kazan khanate, which all have the status of Republics within the structure of the Federation and represent, together with Caucasus, an enclave of formed nations: e.g. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Chuvashiya wait to gain full independence, which would take place without a threat of «creolization» of local elite and transformation of new states into duplicates of Russia.

It is necessary to name separately four Finn-Hungarian countries of Volga area, which are facing civilized problems of northern Europe — these countries are Udmurtia, Mariy AI, Erziyanskiy Mastor and Moshkania — the latter two are in united Republic of Mordovia. (Mordva is a pejorative name, which was included into official documents of RSFSR in the 20th century).

Turkic, Tatar-Bashkortsk territories reach Samara regions, where in the West border on territories of Zhovtyi Klyn. The Caspiy Volga can become a watershed between Kazakhstan and Zhovtyi Klyn — one more agricultural colony-canton of the Ukrainians with own regional identity.

By the way, the Germans were well informed about presence of Zhovtyi Klyn during the World War II. On maps of Reich

commissariat Ukraine included these territories, so northern margins bordered on territories of Erzian Mastor — the most southern Finn-Hungarian country of the world.

The subject of Geography of Kuban, Cossackiya or rather Donschyna is outside of the spectrum of this report. I shall note, however, that problems of «Shock Geography» of Caucasus now does not exist, practically. Owing to classical Russian literature and last wars in Ichkeria, Georgia, Dagestan and Ossetia everyone interested can easily form a real picture of these territories and understand their prospects.

Finn-Hungarian countries

This is where the true Shock Geography begins. It touches the subject of «Russian people» and their national myths.

Detailed information on movement of Finn-Hungarian people in the 9–11th centuries is contained in the published works of Nestor the Chronicler. His data on Finn-Hungarian character of present ethnic center of Russians is shown to be accurate and has been further developed by modern archeological and linguistic data.

In the beginning of the 15th century, Moscow mainly consisted of Finn-Hungarian lands, — it had Slavic territory only on its southern and northern West side. In fact, they were eastern suburbs of Belarus and Ukraine. Thus, the successes made during the period of «collecting lands» Moscoviya achieved solely on Finn-Hungarian territories. Both in the 17th century and today, these districts are not enclaves within the Slavic sea, — on huge open spaces from Kola peninsula to Voronezh and from Pskov up to the Yeneysei they represent continuous and «strongly sewed» Finn-Hungarian continent. After annexation of Finland in 1809, Russian empire consolidated in its structure all Finn-Hungarian nations of the world (except only central-European Hungarians). For the first time since prehistoric dispersion of the Finn-Hungarians, they have started to live under a roof of one state.

After disintegration of the USSR, Russian Federation developed an even bigger, if it is possible to say so, aspect of the Finn-Hungarian country. However, political influence of ethnic Finn-Hungarians on modern Moscow is limited with their internal multi-vectoring. Now there are four big enclaves of Finn-Hungarian people in Russia, who aim regional formations and have, accordingly, different geopolitical centers of gravitation.

First, **Finn-Baltic**, consists of Karelia, Izhoria, Votlandia, Ingermandia, Vepslandia and Country of Seto. East Lapps, which together with Kola peninsula gravitates to integration into Swedish and Finnish Lapland, stands separately in this formation.

Second enclave, **Finn-Volga**, consists of ErzianMastor (Mordovia), MokshenMastor (Western Mordovia), Meshcheria and MariyAl, Muroma, destroyed nowadays, — at first assimilated by the Erzians, i.e. Mordva, and then destroyed by Suzdal invaders, also in reference here.

Third enclave — **Finn-Perm**. It comprises of Udmurtia, Bessermiania, Komi and Komi-Parma.

Then there is **the Urals'** enclave, which consists of Khanty and Mansi, who nowadays are not only associated with small non-Finn-Hungarian people of the North, but also make attempts to be integrated into their own communities.

Three Finn-Hungarian countries stand separately, which are officially considered nonexistent, and their people — dead or anationalistic. These are Meriamaa (or Nero), Meshchera and Muroma.

In his PhD thesis («Merianskyi language» (1986)), Orest Tkachenko specified: «...modern «Russians» are de facto Finns-Hungarians, and «Russian» was one of Finn-Hungarian's dialects (Meriansk)». Actually, he further claims, Russians in central Russia are the Finns-Hungarians who speak one of Slavic languages.

The last woman, who told to her baby fairy tales in Meriansk language died in the late 18–19th century. However, in rather primitive dialects, once great Meriansk language

existed until the middle of 19th century. Powerful Meriansk substratum was kept in language of modern Merians of Kostroma and Vladimir regions.

Meriania was self-sufficient Finn-Hungarian continent with developed culture and economy. Today there are just a few meriano-filsk societies in Kostroma, Rostov and Suzdal, which can still form certain base for revival of meriansk civilizations.

Russians are the Finns-Hungarians. Understanding this fact has exclusive economic value for Ukrainians. In fact, this puts an end to key ideological manipulations made by Moscow, which individually bids for inheritance of Kiev-State forming its claims on a wrong interpreted origin. In 2014, this position was actualized in a war against Ukraine — entirely colonial in its essence. Nevertheless, quoting the above-mentioned myths, Moscow interprets this war also as «civil», where the Slavs are at war with the Slavs.

Entirely anachronistic, or early modern, are such conceptions about «nature of wars» in Russia. However, as these opinions have powerful influence on mass consciousness of citizens of Russia, popularization of Finn-Hungarian origin of «the Russians» are capable to essentially decrease the amount of dispute between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

As a whole, for harmonization of mutual relations with the East and achievement of long-lasting peace, Ukrainian political elite should offer to the Russians two road maps: for European part of Russian Federation — the Finn-Hungarian identity (without Caucasus and Kuban), and for the Asian part — the Siberian identity which should be balanced with national states of the Yakuts, the Buriats, the Tyvints, and the Ukrainians of Zelenyi Klyn.

Dmytro Levus
Centre of public researches
«Ukrainian meridian»

«Not federal federation»
Take as much sovereignty as you can.
Chechnia has tried and has overstrained itself.
B. Yeltsyn

The word-combination «Russian Federation» is used so commonly these days to describe the neighboring state, that it has become a synonym of «Russia». However, this is actually a part of Russia's propaganda. **Modern Russia is not a «federation» to any extent... even in minimal similarity to the meaning of this word. This is realized practically all over the world... even by the leaders of Russia.**

Nevertheless, let us try to examine this question. For this purpose, we shall address the standard definition of the word. «Federation» is the form of a state system, where some parts (sometimes it is a question of parts with a supreme status) of member states have certain legally determined political independence, but are differed from administrative and territorial units of unitary state. Components of federation are original national formations, which are called subjects of federation, and the territory of federation consists of territories of its subjects. Sometimes a federation consists of states which are in the union and keeping independence, create federal state bodies, army, and citizenship. Federal laws operate on the entire territory.

Russia is an interesting case, as it actually has no experience of existence as a federation. According to conclusions reached by Russian researchers, neither Russian empire, nor

the USSR, RSFSR were federations. The problem is historically caused and serious. In particular, it is about the fact that Russian Federation is *asymmetric federation*. The reason for the asymmetry is that different factors are put in the basis of creation of subjects of Russian Federation. Both national and territorial.

Largely, Russia had an opportunity to reform into conventional federation after disintegration of the USSR. We have quoted president Yeltsyn for a reason. He said those words when the Kremlin felt its strength again and came back to its traditional logic of existence directed by unitarity. Before, there was a «parade of sovereignties», it was run by aspiration of separate subjects of Russian Federation to leave its structure (not only Chechen Republic and Tatarstan with Bashkiria, lets remind ourselves about the situations in «Big Cherkesia», and part of Cossacks). Strangely enough, it was possible to organize normal contractual relations and to form *contractual full-value federation (by way of formation)* right then. Russia, however, went another way. At present, it is declared that Russian Federation is a *constitutional federation*. Note that the basis for functioning of federal state there is the Constitution drafted in 1993, and it does not provide the right to leave the «Federation».

According to this Constitution, practically all subjects of former RSFSR have received identical status and rights. It is possible to speak about certain chaos during a transitional period. Then the situation was stabilized. Yet, all has returned. Constitution has remained the same, but reversal of rights of subjects took place rather quickly.

Let us attempt to answer to the question why this occurred, setting aside the clear traditional explanations as to rather centralized nature of Russian nationality in general and fears of any ethnic opposition of the Kremlin. Russian experts see the danger in the «asymmetry» we have already mentioned. Namely, that a subject of the federation can change its status. Thus, p. 5 of art. 66 of the Constitution specifies

the following «Status of subject of Russian Federation can be changed by mutual consent of Russian Federation and in accordance with federal constitutional law». However, the problem is seen again in multi levels of subjects and their «nesting» (this term was even specially invented) when the question of autonomous regions arises. Certainly, the idea of impossibility of national identity within the federation has been formed within the expert and scientific environment. In fact, ethnic formations are rather inclined to leave the RF.

This idea is put into practice. For instance, «unitarism» and unification became state policies of Russian Federation. In general, considering the size of Russian Federation, it may be unnoticeable. Nevertheless, some incidents with taking over the «nesting» national autonomous regions and their expulsion from the Constitution have already taken place. It is interesting that there are a number of projects regarding the creation of other configurations of federation, which provide formation by territorial principle. It is possible to take into account the experience of creation of federal districts — all these also take a step toward unification.

The second point we must consider entails debarring the right to have the «president» as the head within independent formations. The president can only be the leader of the federation. It is significant that this was initiative of Ramzan Kadyrov — Chechen leader, who has the highest status among leaders of all regions.

This point confirms the idea of the unitary character of Russian Federation. It imitates the Russian Empire here once again. Total unification coexisted with actually national autonomies, though in the form of monarchies (Finland and Poland) and dependent khanates (Bukhara, Khivyn, Kokand). However, they did not define general picture, just like now the picture is not defined with presence of several regions with, what it seems, a higher status. All is dependent on a relationship of the Kremlin and the governor of such region. Legal system of Russian Federation does not matter in such conditions.

The problem is that subjects of federation have no real rights. It is not that regions (subjects of federation), which are formally equal, are formed on different principles — national or territorial. The problem is not regarding unnecessary rights given to these regions. On the contrary, the problem is in unnecessary centralization and aspiration of the Kremlin to supervise all fields of activity of the member states. Here is a good example of this — education. Local features of the federation (centrally formed) are practically everywhere, and do not allow to establish a full-value system of education in national languages (classes are taught in native language rarely or optionally in general). Exceptions, under certain circumstances, can be only found in Chechen Republic and Bashkortostan.

Thus, Russian «federalism» is not filled with real content. Attempts to reform it, actually, led to further unification of RF, postponement of modernization and the system's crisis of functioning and communication between the state, its members and federal center.

Oleh Tiahnybok
*Head of the «Svoboda» party,
People's Deputy of Ukraine*

Today's discussion is extremely important. Though, probably, to someone it seems like a discussion of Utopia. We even heard a few laughs.

Ten years ago, on behalf of «Svoboda». I registered a draft bill regarding political lustration. We were laughed at then, and were even called «political dinosaurs». But today every political party in Ukraine considers this subject vital. At the time, our famous film director Juriy Illienko raised a question of Ukrainian informational space's protection, especially from our northern neighbour. He proposed actual, effecting steps of informational defence. However, both the leadership at the time and society closed their eyes and ears to the subject, claiming Russia is a strategic partner. Here is a quote from the first program of «Svoboda» written in 1991: «Svoboda» views the Russian state as one of the reasons for the troubles in Ukraine. Russia, which is traditionally backward-thinking when it comes to Europe, imposed its influence on Ukraine, and for centuries restricted a part of Ukraine from achievements of western civilization in terms of policy, economy, culture and life. Russia, which is traditionally despotic and dogmatic, imposed on Ukraine — which had centuries-old tradition of existence of civil freedom and democratic way of government — other ways of existence. Concept of national state, which is traditional for European countries, is not traditional for Russia. Divergences of views on state between Ukraine and Russia are incompatible here. Unlike Ukrainians, whose opinions and traditions were formed during centuries, Russians have not formed the national identity. Therefore, na-

tional nihilism, which is destructive for people with traditional culture, is a characteristic for Russia. Struggle against these types of impositions is one of tasks of our political power».

Nationalists always advanced the course of history, speaking what can happen and where to expect a threat. Now we should remember the UUN actions and the creation of Anti-Bolshevyk's block, in particular. We have to form close contacts with people who support independence and concentrate on creation of national identity, but temporarily exist under the influence of the Russian empire. We should also keep in contact with European nations. The new «block» must appear in the near future and influence not only Ukrainian policy or post-Soviet countries, but also have its say on the international political arena.

Oleksandr Demchenko
Orientalist

«HOW TO REBUILD RUSSIA»: CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO

1. The best predictor, who foresaw the present conflict with Russia, appears to be the founder of StratFor George Friedman. In his book, published in 2009, he wrote:
 - Conflict between Russia and countries of Eastern Europe will begin circa 2015, and it will become the main problem of the world.
 - Conflict will arise due to Russia's desire to control these countries.
 - Instigation of Russian-speaking minority to uprising as the basic method of pressure, economic war (particularly, gas) and threat of full-scale war with Russia's army will be an additional factor.
 - Russia will try to split the Western block through forming a pro-Russian position within the continental Western Europe.
 - At the same time, some countries of Eastern Europe (Poland and Baltic) will form an anti-Russian block.
 - USA will not take a direct participation in military opposition, but will help with transfer of technologies.

(Friedman's mistake regarding Ukraine).

Thus, he could describe what has happened today as far back as in 2009.

Friedman's forecast concerning future of Russia is unfavorable. He claims it will be overwhelmed with internal problems (in the South, particularly) and by about 2020 it shall hit the wall and will be broken up.

2. This process cannot resemble the disintegration of the USSR. In 1991, unlike present Russia, we had: Rather healthy communist elites, which could take responsibility when needed. In addition:
 - There were clear borders of future states.
 - Healthy and popular democratic opposition.
 The closest analogue: the situation in China in the first half of the 20th century.
 Scenarios: increase of discontent — an attempt to establish dictatorship — formation of alternative cliques of power — war of militarists.

3. It is difficult to define contours of such opposition now. Nevertheless, some things can be assumed. There are few geographically independent regions in RF where military opposition to those who try to usurp leadership in Kremlin can be formed. It is, first of all, Siberia and the Urals, and second — the South (Krasnodar–Rostov–Volgograd), the North of European part (Murmansk–Arkhangelsk), Far East, and at last, the Volga regions (Samara–Ulianovsk). It is difficult to imagine that someone could try to resist Moscow by not relying on Siberia. Taking this information into account, it is possible to imagine the approximate lines of future borders.

4. In national republics, sovereignty may take place — in the least important for war regions and liquidation of autonomy — where a transition of leadership to local field commanders may occur.
 What we can say for sure, is that in conditions of crisis old ethnic conflicts will appear again. Strategy of Russia in dealing with them consisted of establishing the status quo and making both parties to the conflict silent. Thus, the problem is covered, decisions for it are not prepared, and the hatred remains.

These frozen ethnic conflicts are concentrated on Caucasus, and outside of its borders there is the most dangerous situation with the Tatars and the Bashkirs in West Bashkortostan.

On Caucasus such problems are between the Circassians and the Balkars, the Ossetes and the Ingushes, the Ingushes and the Chechens, and in Dagestan there is a set of conflicts, which practically cannot be solved peacefully.

However, apart from ethnic nationalism, there are two more power on Caucasus:

- ruling clans;
- Islamic fundamentalism.

In conditions of an aggravation of conflicts, these three power groups will, most likely, form two-three coalitions, which will compete for leadership on Caucasus.

5. Personally, I am quite sure that history will follow this road. Even if we are to suppose that probability of such succession of events is 10%, 5% or even 1%, it is obvious that nobody will be ready for it. There is only one open research establishment which to certain extent pays attention to national problems in Russia in the context of the world, only one English-speaking journalist, who writes about Russian regionalism and ethnic question. There is no one, who can offer his or her examination of these issues, which will become aggravated over time. Who, for example, can offer the solution of conflict between the Avars and the Kumyks in Dagestan in which two million people can be involved — and between them there were already been armed conflicts in 90s? There is no one.
 Ukraine is not an exception here. It must learn to react better to the events on the world's political arena. Here are just three examples:
 - The leader of Tatarstan's nationalists is going to be imprisoned for some years for support of Ukraine.

- The Circassians have addressed the special agency with the request for recognition of genocide of the Circassians during Caucasian war.
- Several Russian Organizations have urged their compatriots not to take part in the war against Ukraine.

Any of these events have not drawn attention of Ukrainian mass-media and politicians, unfortunately. Ukraine continues to play on the field of Russian mass-media.

But, nevertheless, there is potential and certain interest to this subjects in Ukraine.

Andriy Illenko

*People's Deputy of Ukraine,
«Svoboda» party*

To emphasize the necessity of this discussion, I shall quote words of Chinese philosopher Sun Tszu — he said: «To win, it is necessary to know yourself and the enemy well». Therefore, if it is possible to speak about political system's western policy, east one does not exist as such. It was always a policy of surrender of national interests to the Russian Empire. There was also no formation of identity of that eastern space.

I consider that today's war, which occurs in Ukraine, is, first of all, a war of identity. It is paradoxical, but from the point of view of modern Russia, today's war in Ukraine is defensive. The Russians are sincerely convinced that they are protecting their national identity in this war.

The key here is that in their mythology, which is false and manipulative to the core (but believed by so many), Ukraine is a place where their nation has begun. Therefore, to recognize Ukraine as fully independent means changing their view of themselves. They would have to review all of their history, rewrite their own culture. Therefore, it is necessary to consider what will happen if this change of identity is to take place.

Similar period occurred a hundred years ago. There was a patriotically imperialistic intoxication of 1914, when Russian Empire entered the First World War on economic rise, enormous mobilization and a disaster, which presented itself two years later, with hurrah-patriotism changes that forced Bolsheviks to come to power on slogans of national capitulation and destruction of empire. We can have Russia of 2014 and Russia of 2017, and there can be another Russia and new stage of a disaster.

Also it is necessary to emphasize that we should not have any illusions. I am talking about the public rhetoric of the president's administrations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, public intellectuals, who constantly claim that all problems come only from Putin. It is not quite true. Moreover, there is another, also harmful illusion, which is characteristic for national environment of Ukraine — Russia is artificial, the Russians are artificial, and they will easily collapse. If we think like that, then we are bound to repeat the mistake of Russians who interpreted Ukrainians that way. But they have been breaking their teeth for 350 years when they attempt to bite us. Question of national identity should bypass the superficialities.

Consequently, it is necessary to note that Russians exist, even though their nation was formed on artificial ideologies, but they still have their national identity. This community, which calls itself «the Russians», is strong enough and stable inside. For the last hundred years, they have gone through two periods of crashes and two periods of mobilization. 1917 — disaster and consolidation under Bolsheviks' government, and in 1991, a crisis followed by Putin's consolidation. Therefore, we should not repeat their mistake and call them artificial. At present, we are only in the beginning of interpretation of this complicated question of national identity, history and roots of our northern neighbor.

We need to develop strategy and a concrete plan of action. For instance:

- Increase communication and informational exchange with national republics and national groups within Russian Federation, who position themselves not as Russians, but Caucasian people, i.e. politically purposeful Hungarian-Finns. Ukraine should create political centers that would concentrate on this task.
- Work with Ukrainians, who do not consider themselves Russians and who reside inside and outside of RF. Use their potential to weaken Russia's positions and to adopt our line of thinking.

- Use issues of economic character against the Kremlin. Convince, for example, the Far East that is more advantageous for them (economically) to be separated.
- We should developed a concept for the Russians, not the Ukrainians, the minorities or perceived Hungarian-Finns... we should have something to offer directly to Russians. We must have political model for those who make up the majority of population of Russian Federation. It is necessary to deal with this political kernel, and we should offer them an alternative. It is clear that it is possible to go only this way, it is very long, very difficult road, but we, at least, should see a potential, which lays in a change of their national identity. It can be: a) return to their Finn-Hungarian roots. However, processes of Slavization that are occurring there are rather strong. Therefore, Hungary-Finnization will be not so successful. b) alternative Russian non-imperial identity, with its roots in Velykyi Novhorod, but this process also can be unsuccessful. Thus, we are only in the beginning of developing an answer to this issue.

As it was said by classical political theorists: whilst Russian identity exists, and Russians consider themselves Slavic, who originated from Kyiv and Ancient Rus, this war will last without an end. We do not want to be part of the Russian world, and they do not want to make us free. The Germans, for example, have never considered the Poles part of them in the same way as the Russians do with Ukrainians.

Eventually, Russian Empire will cease to exist, and a new system of relations will be formed on its territory. Therefore, it is already necessary to form an eastern policy in Ukraine, when we still have time to examine which of the variants we have discussed can be successful.

Oleksiy Kurinniy

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West-Russian world as valuable counterbalance to the «Russian world» and model of reformation of Eastern Europe

To outline desirable place and role of Ukraine and Ukrainian people in future geopolitical model of the world, as well as its system of international relations (which undergoes important reformatting nowadays) according to geographical, demographic and ethno-political factors, it is necessary, first, to find out historical number and territorial occupation of the Ukrainians during the beginning of the biggest historical confrontations (**to find out starting conditions**); talk about reprisals and difficult times, which have influenced Ukrainians and their held territories (i.e. between 1914–1926). Secondly, we shall examine the core for certain behaviour and categorize the legal character of our neighboring states' violent actions and of those who tried to ruin the Ukrainian ethnos (to qualify crimes against humanity and to find **legal mechanisms of renewal of the mentioned rights and legal status**). Third, we must determine residual number and modern condition of Ukrainians' movement (**to find out current conditions for geopolitical game**). Then, finally, we shall propose a new model of regulation of Eastern European space after a possible indulgence and disintegration of Russia: with Ukraine playing a leading role within a new, decentralized geopolitical union of equal states, formed on the basis of the above-mentioned geographical, demographic and other factors.

Movement and political influence of Ukrainian state in the period of 1914–1917. Removal of Ukrainian population between 1930 and 1940

First, it is necessary to note that during thirty-year period of wars and other conflicts (since 1914 up to 1947). Ukrainians had very favorable demographic and geographical characteristics. For decades, Ukrainians significantly advanced its neighbors across many demographic factors, as well as peace development and expansion of borders of its ethnic territory (under this last parameter, in the beginning of the 20th century, Ukrainians in Europe ceded only to Russians).

During 18th century, relative density of ethnic Ukrainians within the Russian Empire, according to the calculations made by Russian scientists Y. Vodarskyi and V. Kabuzan, grown from 1719 (the first audit) up to 1795 (the fifth audit): i.e. from 12,9% up to 19,8%, and in 1719 — from 12,9% to 16,1%. This was caused, in particular, by high natural increase of population in steppe of Ukraine and Slobozhanshchyna. In comparison, the percent of Russians fell from 70,7 to 48,9%, and in 1720 — from 70,7 to 68,5%, which was caused by low level of natural increase in Central Great Russian provinces. At the time, Ukrainians occupied the South (named by Russian leadership «Novorosia») to which, during 18th century, an Area of the Army of Don, and Kuban-Chornomoria also integrated, and where the population of Ukrainians reached 52,2% (in 1750s). but the percent of Russians fell to 19%¹.

Peoples	Number (in thousands of people)			Relative density (in %)		
	1719	1795	1795 in 1719	1719	1795	1795 in 1719
Russians	11 127,5	20 117,7	20 061,2 in 1719	70,7	49,8	68,5
Ukrainians	2 025,8	8 163,6	4 721,4	12,9	19,8	16,1
Belarusians	382,7	3 402,5	664,7	2,4	8,3	2,3

These tendencies, which started in 1719, were solid during the 19th and even the beginning of 20th century: Russian sci-

entists V. M. Kabuzan and S. I. Brook mentioned higher birth rate of Ukrainians than Russians. At the same time, scientists mentioned an increase of assimilating processes: thus, in «Novorossia», number of the Ukrainians decreased from 52,5% in 1755 to 41,3 in 1917 — due to the already-mentioned integrating process, mainly. In total, according to the scholars, throughout the second half of the 19th century, 1,5 million of the Ukrainians were «Russified». During the imperial domination, contrary to growth of absolute number of the Ukrainians, their percentage part in structure of the population of the empire fell: from 19,8% in 1795 and more than 20% in the beginning of the 19th century — to 17,5% in 1897 and 17,3% in 1917².

In general, in the end of the 19th – beginning of 20th century (up to 1914). Ukrainians as ethnos were renowned by one of the highest rates of natural increase of population in the world, which has let them not only to leave significantly behind the neighbouring countries, say, the Belarusians, the Hungarians and the Poles, but also to reduce, gradually, the difference with Russians. Thus, in 1719, Ukrainians more than twice ceded to the Russians, whereas in 1795 — less than twice. During the 19th – beginning of 20th century, according to the western doctrine and official statistics, this difference was constantly reduced. As illustrated by the following table 1 see page 53.

It is significant that in the period of just twenty years, during 1877–1897, the number of Ukrainians was actually doubled, and for the following 17 years was grown by another third.

Ukrainian ethnic territory also extended, which was noticed by Russian leaders of the time: in May 1917, during negotiations of the Ukrainian delegation, led by V. Vynnychenko with Provisional government — the latter refused to provide autonomy, and declared that the refusal was based on the absence of power to establish new administrative system of Ukraine with inclusion into its structure... **12 provinces**

(9 — traditional Ukrainian provinces plus, likely, Holmsk province and Kuban region as regions, where the Ukrainians made the majority and, probably, Bessarab or Voronezh province³). Hypothetical Ukrainian nationality within the limits of the named 12–13 provinces illustrated the contours of Ukraine, according to doctrine of authoritative scientists, M. Grushevskiy, S. Rudnytskyi and V. Kubiyovych.

Huge administrative and territorial unit — North Caucasian territory — was formed after final consolidation of Soviet leadership in Ukraine (in districts of Donshchyna and near Caucasus). With an area of 293.652 km² (equal to half of modern Ukraine and exceeds the area of the United Kingdom. Similar to Italy) and with population of 8,36 million (in 1.01.1930 — 8,98 M.) North-Caucasian territory of RSFRR outdid all republics of the USSR, except Russia and Ukraine⁴. But, just like in the case of Army of Don and Kuban — the Ukrainians did not become the title nation or even native people of the given territory, despite the large number of them living there.

According to the first All-Union population census published in 1926, 3,107 million of Ukrainians or 37,2% of all inhabitants (Russians — 45,9%) lived in North-Caucasian territory. It is significant that by national structure of peasantry (which was over 80% of population), in 1926 there was a Ukrainian-Russian parity — 2,8 million of each. So, among males in villages of Northern Caucasus (they were less exposed to assimilation/integration) without national formations (in particular, without Sunzhensk Cossack district) there were 1 290 779 Ukrainians, whereas among inhabitants of villages, there were 1 287 344 Russians. According to S. Rudnytskyi, from 1897 until 1914, at least 15% of people in districts of modern Krasnodar territory, no less than 40% — in present Stavropol (291 thousand in 1926), not less than 30% of population of Tershchyna (193 thousand) and minimum 20% of persons of present Rostov region (503,8 thousand in 4 districts without Taganrog) had been assimilated. In overwhelming majority, Ukrainians who

lived in the region were registered as Russians. Thus, the number of Ukrainians who lived there would have to be increased by 1,443 million (third), constituting **4,55 million or over 54% of inhabitants of the area**⁵. All these territories bordered the soviet Ukraine, forming a non-separable prolongation of Ukrainian ethnic territory, to which modern Ukrainian people, in spite of total removal of local Ukrainian population in 1932–33, have all the rights according to principle of nationality and political self-determination.

In the beginning of 20th century, the area of movement reached its apogee (Y. Loza)⁶ and essentially exceeded districts populated by the Ukrainians on official statistics. The two outstanding ethnographers and researchers of Ukrainians' movement — S. Rudnytskyi and V. Kubiyovych, when talking about the delimitation of Ukrainians' territory offered two borders — minimal and maximal. Accordingly, S. Rudnytskyi believed that authentic ethnic boundary separated minimal Ukrainian territory which, by calculations of the scientist, **in 1914 was 905 thousand sq. km. and had 51 million 249 thousand inhabitants** (from whom **71,3%** or **36,6 million** were Ukrainians). However, lands with unsettled and uncertain ethnic boundaries bordered to this territory. Thus, maximal Ukrainian territory, according to Stepan Rudnytskyi, was, **in 1914, 1 million 56 thousand sq. km. and had 53 million 906 thousand residents** (from whom about 71,7% were Ukrainians, i.e. **38,65 million people**.) As we see, the real number of Ukrainians in 1914 was counted up from **36,6 to 38,7 millions**⁷ — which corresponds to the calculations of scientists V. Kabuzan and O. Miller. It is significant that the given figure exceeds the number of the Ukrainians stated in 2001, not to mention 2014–2015.

Later on (for 15–20 years), as shown by another scientist, V. Kubiyovych, in 1927–1931 total Ukrainian ethnographic territory consisted of **728,5 thousand sq. km.**, on which **48,4 million** people lived, with **36,2 million (74,7%)** of Ukrainians among them. Thus, Ukrainian ethnographic lands

with mixed suburbs were significantly bigger and amounted to **932,1–944,7 thousand sq. km.**, on which 53,8 million persons lived, and **37,6 million (70%)** of them were⁸ Ukrainians. From then on, the number of Ukrainians in immemorial districts did not increase, and in some regions of Slobozhanshchina and Northern Caucasus — catastrophically decreased due to famine, Russification and ethnocide, that was accompanied, in particular, by burning Ukrainian literature in Kuban in 1933⁹.

Let us consider modern numerical ratio of Ukrainians and Russians after the two waves of removals and assimilation (1930–1945 and 2014–2015) (Table 2, page 53):

It is evident from the table that for last 20 years Russians, unlike Ukrainians, lost percent of population even in their own state and in Diaspora. The fall of percent of Ukrainian Diaspora can be due to the fact that many Ukrainians are registering in RF and Kazakhstan as Russians, so, the real ratio between Ukrainians and Russians can be different and be in favour of Ukrainians till the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of Russian-Ukrainian war, which begun as a result of Ukraine-phobia in RF, and hatred of the Ukrainians in Crimea and on the occupied districts of Donbas. Specified kindling of hatred, as well as actions of the Russian State in SRSR-RF (Russia officially recognized itself as an assignee of the USSR) should receive appropriate legal penalties in accordance with the international law.

International experience: territorial changes in context of international political responsibility of states and people for aggression concerning neighbors, genocide and other crimes against humanity

There are still inconsistencies and counter-arguments concerning those bearing political and legal responsibility on international arena (states and people). As always, there are problems of definitions and responsibility when it comes to the beginning of war, for crimes of genocide and other crimes

against humanity¹⁰, and we can actually witness an absence of conventional regulatory or even scientific standards of such responsibility. This is due to a number of reasons. For instance, there is a rarity of precedents of political responsibility of states and people, authorized at international level: throughout the 20th century, only a few of them had territorial losses due to unleashing of wars and committing crimes against humanity. What is more, only few nations in the world have been recognized, with a number of cautions, as those who suffered from genocide and similar crimes (they were committed by states' leadership, which, as a rule, had own titled nations, interested in genocide) — the Gipsy and the Jews, the Armenians, the Ukrainians, population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Cambodia. Another reason for the difficulty — extraordinary responsibility, which predetermines impossibility of its universal normative settlement. As a rule, it comes with confrontations and has political character of correcting international and internal policy of states, which were defeated in these conflicts (namely, Turkey and Germany — because of world wars).

A number of post-war political precedents still show examples of **sanctions (territorial)** as adverse consequences for the state which is guilty of unleashing the war and committing crimes against humanity and its people: as a rule — in favor of suffered community (Turkey concerning Armenia¹¹, Serbian Republic concerning Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany concerning Poland¹²). Variations of possible sanctions and corrections of policy are rather broad. These days, it is possible to talk about such sanctions for genocide, crimes against humanity and participation in world wars:

- Undertaking obligations to assist restoration of the rights of the suffered community on its territory in every possible way, i.e. «**positive protection**» (as post-war policy of FRG concerning the Jews), an acceptability and legitimacy of which is admitted even with the doctrine of Russian chauvinists¹³, most radically falls into Ukrainian situation.

- Change of borders of the state in question (i.e. loss of 25% of eastern German territory by Germany in 1945)¹⁴, and 10% of appreciably ethnic districts as the result of the First World War.
- Restriction of the rights of a State's title nation (which has unleashed war and committed crimes) on self-determination and residing on certain territory. Moreover, the size of the state and ethnic territory of such people (the Germans of Czechia, Poland) also changes. For instance, during the Lozanski conference (1923), «the winners» rejected the requirements of the Turkish party, accused in genocide of the Greeks and the Armenians, concerning self-determination of Turkish population of Western Thrace¹⁵. Referendum on self-determination among of more than 90% of German speaking population of Alsace-Lorraine, Northern Tyrol and Sudetsk region, were not held — these districts were imperatively transferred accordingly to France, Italy and Czechoslovakia in spite of the fact that a number of alienated residents from Germany and Austria within ethnically German districts voted in referendums during 1920–1921.
- Recognition of the suffered community's right to self-determination, isolation and creation of own State irrespective of its post-genocide number and condition — as an exclusive precedent caused by genocide (actually, compensation for those who suffered genocide in Armenia was proclaimed in 1919–1920¹⁶) and other criminal acts concerning the given community (argument for self-determination of Kosovo¹⁷, and also arguments of Russia concerning recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia)¹⁸.

As we can see, such political responsibility in practice is realized by reduction of territory of the state, where, of course, leaders of the state are recognized to be involved in genocide or exercising negative sanctions to social groups: the title nation of «state-originator» (the Germans of Germany in

1945, and in the long term, quite probably, the Russians of RF), the state's ethnic minorities — (the Germans of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and in our case — the Russians of Ukraine), «removal» of certain groups, etc¹⁹. Thus, if an exchange of population between USSR and Poland had the purpose of armed opposition's termination and did not impose sanctions against exclusively one party of the conflict, removal up to 5 million Austrian Germans from Czechia, and also native population from German territories of Silesia, Pomerania and Prussia for further assignments of territories of Poland, can be only partly explained (but nowadays cannot be excused any more²⁰) by necessity of safeguarding of the social order and historical rights of Poland and Czechia on these lands. Thus, these actions concerning Germany and German speaking groups (particularly, the Austrians) can be lawful only in case of recognizing them within the realm of international law regarding political responsibility of ethnic Germans for crimes against humanity.

Otherwise, a violation of international law's doctrines and principles concerning human rights, sovereignty, integrity of state's territory and realization of right of nations on self-determination, is obvious. Without argumentation of political responsibility unprecedented decisions of Versailles, Yalta and Potsdam conferences concerning Germany and the Germans become automatically not legal, and taking into account the consequences (decay of German culture, many thousands victims of deportation) — criminal²¹!

For us, the most significant precedent is the one concerning restoration of legal status and full spectrum of community's rights (suffered from crimes against humanity) in the development of state-territorial system of post-war Iraq during 2003–2008. In particular, special art. 140, according to which Iraq is obligated to take necessary measures on performance of instructions laid out in art. 58 of Temporary administrative law (Transitional Administrative Law), which was added to final edition of Constitution of new Iraq, was approved on

national referendum (held on 10.15.2005), and outlines the requirement of long-term reprisals to those suffered from ethnocide. The article also outlines «normalization» of carrying out population census and referendum concerning legal status (territorial attachment) of a region that has suffered from crimes against humanity²². Moreover, instructions of the article are unique to some extent, since art. 58 specifies that at the highest level of authority it is recognised that there were **deep demographic and territorial manipulations, which have infringed human rights.**

For this reason, legal instructions provided by art. 58 of the Law together with art. 140 of the Constitution delivered steps for **fast and uncompromising elimination of infringements made by S. Hussein's regime.** Thus, it was intended «to take measures on overcoming the injustice caused by the previous regime concerning change of demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, deportations, exile of persons from places of their residence, speeding up the migration to regions in question, settlement in regions of those hostile to the territory, deprivation of inhabitants of work and corrections of their nationality²³». Subsequently, consequences of criminal acts, hostile to the Kurds by S. Hussein's sunitsk Arabian regime, which had all the symptoms of crime against humanity, has been recognized as subject to elimination and correction. Ukrainians should follow such unique precedent concerning estimation and compensation of sufferings caused by RF's in present and wider historical-legal context — e. g. soviet-Bolsheviks' crimes: genocide of the Ukrainians and the violent change of national structure of Northern Caucasus, Slobozhanshchyna, Siryi Klyn (Siberia), Far East, disorganization and elimination of the Ukrainian community by imposed famine and deportations, etc.

Possible international political responsibility of Russian Federation through loss of part of its territory in favour of neighbouring states — and position of Ukraine

Considering mentioned European precedents, validity of a position of known analyst and ex-adviser of the president of Russia on economy A. M. Illarionov does not cast any doubts. He stated: «...in case of inevitable defeat of Russian Federation in hypothetical full-scale military conflict against the modern world community» — where there will be an attempt to stop Russia's militarism, chauvinism and aggression, steps toward Russia's «reconstruction» and its society will be taken.

As a result, apart from reparations and compensations, which are traditional for international law, Russia, as Turkey (in the end of the First World War), and just like Germany and Italy following the results of both world wars, — will be deprived certain territories: «Certain parts of modern territory of Russia, which are historical areas of neighboring states, but have been annexed, can be returned to these states..... Belhorod, Kursk, Voronezh, Rostov regions, Krasnodar region — to Ukraine»²⁴. We shall note that the given statement is the first example of recognition of Ukrainian rights to its own ethnic districts in structure of Russia by a Russian analyst and a former statesman.

Ukrainian politicians have to remind themselves and others about scientifically proven claims as to ethnically Ukrainian regions of Russia and legitimacy of putting the question concerning restoration of the Ukrainian presence on Kuban, Donshchyna and near Caucasus with perspective opportunity to reintegrate these regions into the structure of Ukrainian state in case of disintegration of Russia or its reconstruction. It is important that analytical investigations concerning necessity of qualitative change of geopolitical role of Ukraine is switching the role of the country from a neutral «buffer» between western civilization and the «Russian world» — to, as was once in the 13th century, being an important part of the «board of Europe».

It may sound paradoxical at first, but these days, a total or even considerate defeat of Russia in armed-political opposition with Ukraine is unfavorable for the USA and Europe. In fact, such defeat can set off a chain reaction and uncontrollable disintegration of Russian.

State, that would also strengthen Central-Asian crisis, where in fact, economy and human resources of the region are focused on Russian markets, not to mention fragmentation of a country with nuclear arsenal. For this reason, we should consider the initiatives focused on total reconstruction of Russia similar to that which took place in the South of the USA (after the abolishment of slavery) or Germany after the Second World War, which included denazification, prohibition of communism. Demilitarization and serious prosecution of criminals (especially those who stirred up hatred).

As the West, which also may be lacking the necessary interest and political will nowadays, cannot put the specified tasks into practice — this burden should be carried by Ukraine, which will be difficult (but inevitable, because it is impossible to keep separate from Russian society, where an overwhelming majority is aiming for a full liquidation of Ukraine and its civil society). This new role should be taken by Ukraine in exchange for a recognition of its equal rights within the international political arena and becoming a full-value partner of the West. Subsequently, only Ukraine will be potentially ready to provide the most important values for Europe: safety, geopolitical control and stability on realms of Eastern Europe. It is affirmed that Ukraine will become an ally of the USA and EU, but only when it will offer itself as guarantor of safety on space of post-Putin's Russia, and not only on territorial, but also informational and perceptual issues²⁵.

Therefore, it is highly important (both Ukrainian politicians and analysts should realize it by now), that such activity should not be altruistic and sacrificial for the Ukrainians' side. Nor should it be caused by either inevitability, or blind

trust in human rights and other western values. It should not be predetermined with any other motives such as acceptance of mutual destiny in building a structure of former «prison of people» (as it was in Central council's time) or declaration of usual «campaign for white race» (these imperial civilized dreams, unacceptable to neighbours, inevitably led people to huge losses — there is an example of not only German Reich, but also «export of revolution» dream on the USSR's side and even attempts to create world's Catholic empire by Charles V or to restore Roman empire by Yustynian). Ukraine should be guided by an independent state whose leaders are concerned predominantly with national interests of Ukrainian people — who not only want to overcome a dangerous enemy... but an enemy who has gone mad and threatens the existence of Ukrainian people per se, and of all Europe for that matter. Thus, Ukraine and its society should remember the issues raised regarding formation of a nation and political self-determination, and so, at first, within its own society (to form a public consensus), and then at diplomatic level raise the question of «territorial compensation» for events of 2014–2015 — quoting Russia as evidence (Putin's «Crimean» and «Valdai» speeches), reforms of the international law and extraordinary circumstances of the situation. A chance of getting corresponding guarantees is entirely possible, considering the importance of the issue. In fact, under such circumstances, territorial properties were received by Italy and Romania (the latter doubled their own state territory) in the First World War, but the independent Armenia was not formed, contrary to frank declarations, because of the need to create a «protective board» against Bolshevik's Russia.

We also have sufficient demographic and other resources to develop such strong country. Ukrainian population, especially within the ethnic districts, was decupled, disorganized and assimilated, but not removed completely. For example, the head of the Centre of Ukrainian cultural autonomy of the

South of Russian Federation Ihor Zhuha has declared that native Ukrainians today constitute approximately **60** percent of Kuban's population²⁶. According to an expert on historical sciences D. Bilyi, in spite of enormous losses suffered by Ukrainian people in the form of famine, reprisals and deportations (up to 70% of Ukrainian population of Kuban), «actual percent of the Ukrainians in Kuban and Northern Caucasus has remained rather significant: as a whole, in Northern Caucasus and Kuban, approximately 50,5%»²⁷.

These estimations ring true even according to the opposite party: the data of the Institute of CIS (who often display prejudicial behavior toward Ukrainians) shows that the greatest number of Ukrainians living in Russia (beginning of the 21st century) resided in Kuban (up to **47%**): «Strictly speaking, ratio of Russians and the Ukrainians in Kuban constitute **49 to 47%**. It is necessary, whenever possible, to restrict distribution of this statistics»²⁸.

West-Ukrainian as valuable and geopolitical alternative to «Russian world»

If Ukraine will play an important role within the new Eastern-European system of protection, then this protection can be formed with a new — effective and complete — geopolitical union of post-Soviet states, incorporated not only due to common geopolitical needs and interests, but also common legal culture, historical development, culture, values, religion and language. We are talking about the concept of «West-Russian world» as opposed to already discredited «Russian world». The basic features of such geopolitical union will be:

- True decentralization: this geopolitical union, as a union of sovereign national states, should be more similar to European Union, as opposed to, say, Putin's Customs Union. Thus, Kiev will carry out a role of not an imperial center («The third Rome»), but will behave as a spiritual and cultural cell connecting the global network of newly created civil society («The second Jerusa-

lem»). Subsequently, Ukraine will be at the core of this West-Russian world and shall offer healthy East-Slavic oriental traditions.

- Accordingly, West-Russian world will be guided not by westernized understanding of right, culture and a way of life, but will find the best (most fitting) practice for its development, corresponding by advanced achievements of western civilization. For instance, perhaps the issue of women' rights should be considered not through a prism of 1960s brochures and textbooks on feminism, but on the basis of authentic sources of rights and morals, such as the «Russian Truth», Zboriv's Agreement and Constitution of P. Orlyk. These publications contain instructions concerning improvement of social and economic relations, protection of rights of women and children, cancellation of death penalty, political restraints, the system of counterbalances, etc. Hence, legal, ideological, cultural and religious properties of Russian princely and Cossack times should be appreciated, and their experience — to be studied in comparison with similar achievements of other national states of West-Russian world.
- It must be made clear that every state, involved to West-Russian world, shall belong to its people (the title nation), and this should a right accepted by other member states and a mutual assistance and respect should be offered for things like protection of own language, culture, traditions, and ethno-national base must be created with strict adherence to protection of the rights of ethnic minorities and native people.

It is possible to outline three levels of values and political directions, which will be protected within the West-Russian concept and will provide equal removal of the Ukrainians from assimilating imperial project of Russian dross as well as denationalized influence of European left-Marxist and liberal doctrines (regionalization, national assimilation, etc.). Thus,

Ukrainian people will be protected both from dissolution in geopolitical union, as well from further assimilation.

Let us draft the above-mentioned topics in «the most-the least important» order. However, all of them are important and indispensable for harmonious development of Ukrainian people and the nation's allies:

1. **The highest geopolitical level of West-Russian world** as international super-national union of national states, incorporated with common geopolitical interests and public values.
2. **Political nation** as a civil society formed by citizens of all nationalities based on official language, traditions and culture of the title nation. Already, in current Ukrainian Constitution, «Ukrainian people» or «people of Ukraine» are defined as everybody who have Ukrainian citizenship, and, importantly, follow the requirement concerning respect of Ukraine, culture and traditions of ethnic Ukrainian nation, other minorities and native people.
3. **Ethnic community** — as the title nation of Ukraine (and similar in allied states) that has formed the given state and has given it its name and is subjected to special protection taking into account hundred years of struggle for nationality and regular infringement of its rights and interests, in particular by suffering genocide imposed by Russian State. Institution and legalization of ethnic title nation of Ukraine will allow to keep the basis of identity of Ukrainian state better in conditions of setback of Soviet influence, creolization, assimilating a significant part of society and unwillingness of western liberal doctrine to consider specific Ukrainian (and in a wide context — Eastern-European) realities.

Interestingly, a recommendation to reform the Eastern-European block and creation of alternative to Moscow and its future «Russian world» by adding Ukrainian ethnic districts to parent state, and creation of mutually beneficial cooperation with neighbouring states (also «enslaved» in the past), were offered by Ukrainian Diaspora doctrine in 1940s: «Problem of


Ukrainian territorial policy comes up. The question is: would it be better to have a smaller territory and restore a Ukrainian state, but to gather scattered Ukrainian people on it, or to extend its territory without an attachment?». Whilst dealing with the problem of correcting the border with Russia considering northern part of Slobozhanshchyna staying outside of Ukraine, and huge districts on South-East from Don and near-Caucasus behind which are still stretched Ukrainian colonial lands in Asia, Ukrainian analysts faced the dilemma: «Territorial distribution without stronger + attachment of national territory, or a smaller, but entire territory». Three algorithms of geopolitical actions thus also become available: 1) feel satisfied with a limited national territory...; 2) direct efforts to integrate into Ukraine eastern near-Caucasus and even lands in Siberia — which cannot be performed without solving problem of Don and Cossack lands; 3) the most constructive solution (under present political conditions) — make an effort for a number of new states to appear on ruins of Russia (such as Don, Cossack state, Siberia, etc.), form a close union with these countries and their guarantee of rights of Ukraine and Ukrainians²⁹.

Year	Source, researcher	The Ukrainians	The Russians	Majority of the Russians
1719	Y. Vodarskyi, V. Kabuzan	5 952	11 127,5	1,869
1795	V. Kabuzan	10 683	20 061,2	1,877
1840/1843	Ya. Shafaryk	13 144	36 000	2,7
1858	V. Kabuzan ³⁰	15 971		
1877	Peoples of Russia — S.Ph.: 1877 ³¹ .	11 000 (only Russia)	40 000	3,6
1886	Alphab. list — S.Ph.: 1895 ³² .	17 110 (only Russia)	58 000	3,4
1897	V. Kabuzan	26 369	55 667 469	2,1
1910/1917	V. Kabuzan	35,533 M. (and 1,5 are assimilated)	60–65 M.	
1914	A. Krymskyi	35 M. (and 1,5 are assimilated)	65 M.	1,85
1926/1931	V. Kabuzan	37 228	77 791 124	2,1


Table 1

Year	The Ukrainians		The Russians		Majority of the Russians
	Ukraine	Diaspora	RF	Diaspora	
1989	48,29 M.		148 (145,16 + 2,8) M.		3 times
	37,4 M. 37 419	10 M. (25–30 M.)	119,9 M. (119 865 946)	CIS: 25 M. Others: 2,8 M.	
2001–2	46,5 M.		135,9 (132,4+3,5) M.		2,9
	37,5 M. 37 541 693	8 M. (25–30 M.)	115,9 M. (115 889 107)	CIS: 16,5 M. Others: 3,5 M.	
2010	44 M.		129,3 M.		2,9
	37,5 M. 37 541 693	6,5 M. (25–30 M.)	111 M. (111 016 896)	CIS: 15,5 M. Others: 2,8 M.	
2015	42 – 42,5 M.		125–126 M.		2,94– 2,96
	35,5 – 35,8 M.	6,5 M. (25–30 M.)	109–113 M.	CIS: 11 M. Others: 2,8 M.	

Table 2



Europe in 1918. State boundaries officially recognized by international treaties as well as the effective military and political control lines in Europe during the Spring-Summer 1918 (as the result of the Brest treaty).



The Disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1918. State boundaries officially recognized by international treaties as well as the effective military and political control lines in Europe and Asia during the Spring-Summer 1918 (as the result of the Brest treaty and the civil war in former Russia).

NOTES

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- 20 Not casually ex-minister of foreign affairs of Czechia Yan Kavan has certified collective aspiration of Czech society to try to get out of problem, having declared: «Why should we bring to a focus decrees of Benesh?... They belong to the past and should remain in the past». — See: Putting The Past To Rest // Time. — 2002.
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Yuriy Oliynyk

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«Ukrainian studies of strategic disquisitions»*

One of the main problems stimulating the collapse of Russia is the deficiency of effective communication between the majority of parts within the country (such as Northern Siberia, the Far East, etc.).

Part of the territories will attract attention of some other states — the Northern Caucasus, where the influence of the Moslem countries will gain strength, the influence of Ukraine, which is interested in Kuban region.

These days some regions have already integrated into various economical areas. While the European part and western Siberia still remain feedstock and raw materials appendages of the European Union, the most developed regions of the Far East (Khabarovsk, Amur region) are tightly integrated into the Asiatic-Pacific area (from China to Australia), trading and exchanging in human resources and financial capital with the neighboring China, Japan, South Korea, and at the same time developing import and resource exchange with the western regions of the USA and Canada.

There is a clash of interests occurring between the Russian population, local population, Ukrainian Zeleny Klyn, China's foreign interests (in its former provinces) and the concernment of Japan in the islands near Sakhalin (no peace treaty between the USSA, presently Russia, and Japan has been signed since 1945). Many historical claims can be seen — China had owned the territory of the Primorye since 1689, when our hetman Skoropadsky, being exiled, took part in the settlement of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, and this fact is concealed by the Russian history. Ukrainian diplomacy should get ready to sup-

port Ukrainian population, to achieve mutual agreement with China in the sphere of interests of China and Ukrainian Klyn, local nations and nationalities, to prevent possible war for the territory redistribution with the usage of nuclear weapons.

Some regions where some assimilated nations are settled develop humanitarian collaboration with the neighboring regions (e.g. Tuva with Mongolia and China).

The warranty of the least bloody partition of Russia is the control by the neighboring influencing centers (EU, Ukraine, China, the USA), which have to stop the uncontrolled expansion of nuclear technologies. Ukraine should play the major role in Volga region, the Northern Caucasus and Chernozemye, controlling nuclear objects on these territories.

Economic problems: some underpopulated regions will become extremely rich due to export of natural resources, while others will grow poor because of the lack of economical development. Here such megalopolis as Moscow and the neighboring regions are the first in the list to lose the sense of their existence. Rise of crime, communication collapse, stream of refugees are predicted. This region will need humanitarian aid of international community.

Without the reconstruction of economy controlled by external forces central Russia is at the greatest risk of turning into a failed state, such as Somali or Syria, that will become the epicenter of drug traffic and terrorism.

Oleh Shro

A Russian publicist, «The New Region»

Modern Russia is actually the realization of a global criminal community. Speaking of its management system, one can be presented as follows: governors and regional heads are appointed by the president, being legitimized by means of elections or by the appointment as acting officers. Governors are responsible for the appointment of city mayors. In such a way we get an irresponsible vertical being built. A high-ranking official has strictly limited obligations; if a non-standard situation occurs, an instruction or command should come from the higher level. All these factors lead to «manual control». In case there appear too many local points like that, we'll have the situations where at least 2–4 regions become uncontrolled. As a result loss of control may initiate chain reaction. And here the main factor may be not even national or regional separatism, but the offended regional elite, which will start to struggle for power against, for example, federal center or will try to gain control over the neighboring regions. This may destabilize the Russian Federation. The only thing preventing such a conflict now is a high level of the population's social passivity.

Nowadays nuclear weapon of the Russian Federation is a bluff, but it is still dangerous as it can be used for terrorist threats. Nuclear technologies are also dangerous as themselves, as Russia can pass them to someone or someone can take them and then the control will be lost. I consider this is a really great problem.

Bohdan Chervak

*First deputy head of
the State Television and Radio Committee*

We have found ourselves in the situation, when a so-called eastern vector of the Ukrainian foreign policy has crashed, including the concept of mutual relations between Ukraine and Russia, which had existed for more than last 20 years, but cannot stand criticism and has turned out to be disastrous. Thus, a new concept must be considered. The discussion being conducted is not new at all. In 1920–1930, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists organised a similar discussion. Some said that «Russia is the colossus with feet of clay, it will surely fall, it just has to be pushed». This thought belonged to Dmytro Dontsov. The others said that it was not true, Russia was not the colossus with feet of clay and it would be very hard to fight against it. In my opinion, we should be honest with ourselves and admit that we have to deal with a strong country, a country maintaining a very strong army. We should also admit that Ukrainian army cannot presently fight against Russian army at the same level and that the question of Russian-Ukrainian confrontation is not a matter of contemporaneity, which can be resolved in the nearest future. We have a very strong opponent.

We now realize that no matter which processes take place in Russia — will it be a federative, a fascist or a democratic state — any regime, replacing Putin's one, will be anti-Ukrainian and no matter what will the name of the present be, he will take a distinct anti-Ukrainian stand until we win the war.

The popular nowadays idea as for the bad Russian president and good Russian people can not be agreed with. There is no good Russian people. All social researches point to the

fact, that 70–80% of good Russian people support Putin. This also should be taken into consideration when we form new foreign policy regarding Russia.

Sirs Bolani

The head of Kyiv society «Erzian Wall»

I was lucky that I was in Ukraine at a time when the fate of the Ukrainian and Russian people was decided. When they say «good» people, «bad» people — it reminds me of discussions on the Internet where everyone is trying to offend his/her converser, but this is wrong, the Ukrainian people are wise, so one needs to look at it with understanding. Our main mistake is that we try to duplicate the behavior of the Imperial circle that confronts us. On the other side there are people who are simply not informed at all. To defeat Russia, we must defeat the Empire, but first unite and begin to inform those we consider the good or bad people, because they are different. The trouble with Ukrainians is that we know very little about these peoples.

Today, when someone accuses Putin, they do not take into account the processes which are irreversible, such as the process of disintegration of the Empire, when the system capacity of the Empire is set to zero, the clock resets in 1917, but the Communists tried to save the Empire, then tried to save Gorbachev, now Putin is just trying to save the Empire, because the Empire that is not expanding — dies.

Russian nation is an artificial nation, because a lot of the language and other parts of culture are taken from the peoples living on the territory of Russia. You cannot look at the Nations living in Russia down, we are all human and all have a right to a normal life.

Bohdan Halayko
Director of research
Institute of Ukrainian studies

For Ukraine it is important to respond to the challenges of the present stage of national affirmation. In the scientific community, the struggle for defending Kyiv's heritage is important, underlining the continuity and succession of Ukrainians' development. Till today, there are many scientists who are in captivity of the Soviet riverbed and there are supporters of the concept of the «three fraternal nations». We should start the project of Ukrainian heritage and to show that this is our Ukrainian history.

On the issue of Ukrainian language and Ukrainians, it is very important to strengthen communication and support Ukrainians abroad. In the Russian Federation, Ukrainians are one of the largest minorities. Often when talking about the oppression of Russians in Ukraine, hardly anyone remembers that in Russia it is difficult to implement Ukrainian schools, to educate children of Ukrainian traditions. We can draw on the experience of other countries, so why not introduce a so-called «map of Ukrainian for Russian citizens», which would provide certain priorities in the territory of the Ukrainian state — University admission, scholarships, recreation activities for children. In addition to scientific discussions, you can implement the assistance in the short term, which should give a definite result.

Victor Roh
The editor of the newspaper «The Path of Victory»

Today we build our concepts not on an empty surface. In the middle of the last century, the ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism laid a solid Foundation. Among them the special place belongs to Yuri Lipa. Its geopolitical trilogy («the Appointment of Ukraine», «Black sea doctrine», «Distribution of Russia») and relevant today. We must answer the question: «Who are we, why, what is our mission and our strength, where and who is our enemy?» Linden had offered their answers to these questions.

«Distribution of Russia» is a book of diagnosis, recipes and the sword. Most of our theorists of the last century wrote and thought about the Ukrainian shield. Linden wrote and thought about the sword. This work is deep and comprehensive analysis. It has a historiosophical, anthropological, economic, demographic, geopolitical, psychological, cultural components. A thoughtful scientist, a professional doctor with a firm hand surgeon performs a craniotomy was performed. Cancer the disease called cancer still a disease, not a runny nose, gangrene called gangrene, not inflammation. According to diagnosis and prescription.

As would not call Moskovsiy, be it the Russian Empire, the USSR, the Russian Federation is a long time in a multi-ethnic conglomerate that spiritually fed by false pseudo-historical myths, phobias and addictions and deceptive Horde-Conquistador messianism, and physically — the blood and the body, enslaved and assimilated people. Both first and second aspects of the key object acts as the Ukraine and Ukrainians as a nutrient medium.

Russia has long lived in a kind of system of «arbitrariness and subservience»: despotic «arbitrariness» on top and «sub-servience» on the bottom. This system is for Russians is familiar, comfortable, and the only alternative is Russian revolt «senseless and merciless». «Third Rome» is actually a «Second Babylon», with the ensuing consequences.

For Ukrainians and other freedom-loving people to freely and safely move in their ethnic lands, it is necessary to stop Russia. This threat to civilization can only be stopped with the force. We should demonstrate this force.

Today, we again need to adopt the universal concept of the OUN, the concept of the common front enslaved and besieged Moscow peoples, the concept of Antibilshhevik bloc of Nations, the concept of mobilization, organization and support first of all on own forces, the OUN slogan «Freedom to Nations and to man!», practices of the ideologues of the OUN Bandera, Stetsko, works of Dontsov and Lime.

It is gratifying that today these ideas are interesting not only to a narrow circle of researchers, but also to those who were in the highest echelons of political power. It is noteworthy that the Preface to this edition was written at the time Deputy Chairman of the SBU, and now the people's Deputy of Ukraine Andrey Levus.

And finally, a few quotes Linden:

«The separation of Ukraine, damming her for the enemies of all roads to the South would be only the beginning of a great historical process. Because when the state of oppression, chaos and destruction — Russia — will survive, it means: there is no Ukraine — the center of order, wealth and dignity.

Ukraine is the burial ground of the Russian Empire. Can't imagine a different future. The destruction of Russia as the center of supranational allocation of land over the river, the Pechora and the White sea — in accordance with their national and historical content is a prerequisite for strong Ukraine.

Ukraine, with the geopolitical reliance on the Black sea, may exist, but to exist and develop only if it will not allow rivalry in the North.

National state of the Finnish and Uralic peoples on the territory of the present Russian Republic is the least that is needed. Second, the current demographic of the Moscow center from these areas and suppression of heavy industry here, bloated Moscow. When later outline national borders «Russians», then create a state less Ukrainian.

So, national Moscow, not the supra-national monster that is trying to shield itself behind Greek Orthodoxy and/or the Jewish «International»...

It is impossible to reconcile Moscow center with the Ukrainian center, it is impossible to talk about public cooperation in these two centers. On open spaces of the great Russia there cannot be two great industrial centers, two great power centers, two large collections of energy! They mutually exclude themselves.

Only in this realm our task is set correctly. Ukrainians are fighting not only for fairness but also for the supremacy of justice. Talks about the compromise on the modern Russian statehood should not occur. The only salvation for the existence of the Ukrainian statehood is the complete destruction of the Russian power.

Ukraine will be free not after the liberation of Kyiv, but after the destruction of Moscow as the capital of the Russian superpower», as predicted by Yuriy Lypa.

Today problems, which were vocalized by Lypa more than 70 years ago, are extremely relevant. It is appropriate and necessary to address the heritage of our great predecessors, and then to learn to navigate on their own strength and a unified strategy to see the interests and good of the Ukrainian nation.

Alexander Maslak
«Rubicon» group, analytical expert

Everyone here presented for the discussion right things about the future strategy, so I would like to discuss the tactical things nowadays. Many of our officials and higher rank politicians talk about potential disparity between Ukraine and Russia. They point out that Russia has higher military and economic potential but at the same time has higher potential for conflict. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not use this fact in current military policy. For example, top managers of many national TV channels refused to illustrate the topic of Rafis Kashapov because it seems no longer relevant, although the example is very important in my opinion. Tatar national movement activist publicly argued for Ukraine and suffered for it. Therefore this event should have been illustrated by leading Ukrainian TV channels. There are a lot of tactical things like that, but our politicians have no strong desire to apply these facts in the current situation.

Oleh Lisniy
Analytical center «Politics» Vice-President

I suppose that problem-solving solution of the situation concerning Russia is not a single day process but it is time to begin. We need to move into the enemy territory and do visible things because Ukraine will win but unfortunately not as fast as we would like. We did not attack, we are just trying to protect our land and Europe as well. *God forbid* for Ukraine to not withstand in the struggle with Russia. Estonian experts have already informed that in that case they will face a real danger and would struggle since the country is so much smaller, although it is under the NATO's «umbrella».


Andriy Mokhnyk

NU «Svoboda» Deputy Chairman,
People's Deputy of Ukraine
Environmental Minister (2014)


As we can see, there is a fear of Ukrainian nationalism throughout 23 years of the country's independence. This is why we cannot use theoreticians and practitioners' workings on Ukrainian nationalism to *nation-building*. If the ruling elite was guided by the ideology of nationalism during these 23 years, the current war would be impossible, but even if it would occur, it would only take place on the modern Russian territory. Looking at the workings of the Ukrainian emigration, we can see two main directions as to how the Soviet Union collapsed. The first one is Bahryanyj who prophesied: «Komsomol members shall become builders of new independent states». On the other side was Bandera, who said: «It would be impossible to gain independence without war of national liberation».

«Why there is no war?» we wondered for 23 years. Perhaps theorists of nationalism were wrong, but now we can witness the unstoppable war of national liberation at the East of Ukraine. It seems as if Yuriy Lipa wrote this not in the past but in present: «It is impossible to reconcile Moscow center with the Ukrainian one, also we cannot speak about the collaboration of the two. There cannot be two major industrial state centers in great Russia and two major energy collectors as well. They are mutually exclusive». Ukrainian movement — a struggle not only for justice, but also for the supremacy of justice in surrounding territories. There is no way to compromise between modern Russian statehood and the Ukrainian one, so the only salvation for existence a complete destruction of Russia's greatness. Ukraine will be free not after Kyiv is liberated, but after the full destruction of Moscow as a su-


perpower state. This is the maxim which should have guided the Ukrainian political elite in their aspirations, but instead there is fear and a sense of inferiority on their part, which led to today's situation. Regarding the practical sphere, I can say nowadays only Ukraine has technology, professionals and human potential to become a guarantor of nuclear stability. Why not try and sign a security guarantees memorandum in Budapest for those state entities that will formed at the current Russian territory. Today we have a serious threat of revenge of anti-Ukrainian forces inspired by Russia. Taking into consideration upcoming local elections, we can end up with so-called «Novorossia». It is important to note that one of the most significant parts of such revenge consisted of «universal memorandums», which allowed return the Party of Regions to Ukrainian politics. These memorandums are similar to Minsk Agreement. Analysis of Minsk Agreements — namely the part concerning the mentioned possibility of revenge — is extremely important nowadays.




Map 1. Map of areas with different national status and «non-national territories» in structure of Russian Federation (based on political and regional map of 2001 year: <http://www.russiamap.org/map.php?map=political-admin-01>)



Map 2. The map of probable disintegration of Russian Federation with an estimated considering Finno-Ugric identities and Ukrainian colonial territories (according to the map of the textbook «Ethnopolitical map of XXI century»: <http://svit21.ho.com.ua/>)



Map 3. Territories of public entities that can be formed after the disintegration of modern Russian Federation (according to the magazine «The Ukrainian Week»: <http://tyzhden.ua/World/113654>)



Map 4. Post-Russian border: «invisible» countries of central Russian Federation, colony countries of Ukraine – Grey, Yellow, Green Ukraine, Caucasus, recovered territories, that can join to other countries.

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Expert discussion

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